Lukashenko tells about a dialogue with the EU fearing the pressure from Moscow
10 мая 2012, 15:35
During two days, on 8 and 9 May, President Alexander Lukashenko in his speeches touched upon the foreign policy issues, focusing on the pressure on Belarus from the outside.
But was it said in the message to Belarusian people and parliament, as well as in the speech at the Victory Day, something new, which can affect the development of relations with Europe or with Russia, to give an additional impetus to cooperation with neighboring states?
About this "Ezhednevnik" asked the head of the analytical projects of the information company BelaPAN, political scientist Alexander Klaskouski.
- In the message to the people and parliament a remarkable greed in statements regarding the relationship with Europe and Russia was demonstrated. It was said even more about China, than about these two vectors. Although they are fundamental. And I think that such greed in statements, and the transfer of the date of this message indicates uncertainty of the Belarusian leadership. After all, Belarus now has quite uncertain relations with Europe and Russia. Transfer of the message could be explained by waiting to clarify the situation. But it became just a little bit clearer. The liberation of two political prisoners was not enough to ensure that Europe will begin to make broad gestures. In Moscow Putin also is busy with his current business. Therefore, the carefulness in the statements is caused by the nebula with respect to own further actions. As a result, phrases about the need for dialogue with Europe sound. But, of course, for Belarusian leadership it is needed, but not in order to adopt standards of democracy, even though in the message the phrase of readiness to learn them was voiced. Belarus needs Western money and freedom of geopolitical maneuver, precisely because in the near future the pressure from Moscow may be increased. So the thoughts of the dialogue have sounded. But they are interspersed with ritual combat posts and statements that we won't be bent, be broken or bowed.
- To what extent, it is reasonable to speak of the dialogue with the West, not mentioning the dialogue with the Belarusian opposition and civil society?
- If the Belarusian authorities, gnashing their hearts can allow themselves the dialogue with the West, they just don't see the opposition at all, and don't want to consider it as a real player in the political arena. And it is much visible, when Lukashenko starts talking about the opposition, he starts to do it very emotionally, dramatically, he loses self-control. And although Brussels and Washington are constantly talking about the need for dialogue with the opposition, I think, at most, what the Belarusian authorities are being able to do - is to simulate this process.
On the other hand, when Alexander Lukashenko talks about the weak opposition, he is pretty much right. Today the opposition is really weak and fragmented. And if you ask a question, with whom to engage in dialogue, it turns out, the opposition can not agree even among themselves.
However, Lukashenko in his message said, the parties are dwarf, no one knows them. But when he said "a", he didn't say "b". After all, the condition in which the parties are now - is the result of pressure, the result of the fact, they were purposefully driven into the underground for 18 years.
- Nevertheless, was it something new in the two speeches?
- I would "factor out" the speech at the Victory Day. It cannot be the subject of political analysis. Even the message is largely ritualistic. And statements like at the Victory Day, are designed for veterans, people who the familiar with the Soviet rhetoric. And I think, the statements sounded there, should not be taken for real. Concerning the message to the people and parliament, it has demonstrated the absence of any fresh ideas. If in previous messages the authorities tried to put forward any slogans, then now, simple set of some stock phrases have sounded. As a result, such a lack of content was attributed to tactical, rather than strategic overtones of the message.